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Abstract
This preliminary research examines traffic safety variables that are influencing the behavior of 
interest groups in the European Union.  Utilizing a fixed effects estimation model, this research 
identifies variables that are influencing traffic deaths in the 15 member states that made up the 
European Union prior to May 1, 2004.  Time series data analyzing the impact of vehicle 
concentration in member states, unemployment, length of roadways, legal driving blood alcohol 
levels, speed on roadways, gross domestic product per capita, and alcohol consumption per 
capita are examined across time in these countries.  Further research on this question will 
investigate how interest groups are altering the relationship between these variables and the 
dependent variable, traffic fatalities.  In turn, future research will investigate the lobbying efforts 
of interest groups as they attempt to influence traffic safety policy in the European Union.3
Introduction
As in most nations, traffic and transport safety is a major concern for the 27 member-
states that constitute the European Union (EU).  And, while policy makers, legislators, and 
interest groups have all worked to make transportation in Europe safer, more efficient, and 
environmentally more “green,” serious issues remain for the EU and its member-states as it tries 
to reduce the number of fatalities that occur on EU roads and motorways each year.  The factors 
contributing to traffic safety, however, are not well researched.  In this paper, we examine traffic 
safety in the EU and those variables that contribute to traffic fatalities.  
Trends in traffic fatalities in the EU provide an overview of the problem, and we examine 
state measures aimed at increasing road safety and reducing fatalities.  We then discuss the 
European Charter on Road Safety, a formal statement on road safety signed in Dublin on April 
6, 2004.  This charter is a key element of the European Road Safety Action Program that has as 
its goal the reduction of road fatalities in Europe by at least 50% by 2010.  Given the goal of this 
program, we next examine a number of variables that affect the occurrence of traffic fatalities 
using a cross-sectional time series analysis.  While many of our findings are rather 
straightforward, it becomes clear from our analysis that the factors impacting upon traffic 
fatalities across the EU are different from those issues that affect traffic fatalities in the United 
States.  We conclude with a discussion of future research as it relates to interest groups in the EU 
and suggest strategies that might be used by the EU to reach those goals advanced in the 
European Road Safety Action Program.  4
Traffic Safety in the EU: An Overview
Traffic crashes, including road, rail, and maritime traffic, claimed about 41,500 lives in 
the EU in 2000.  Of those fatalities, road accidents accounted for 40,812 of these deaths, and 
more than 1.7 million were injured.  While it is important to point out that Europe today is a 
much safer place to drive than it was thirty, or even ten, years ago,
1 road accidents in the EU 
remain the prime cause of death for persons under the age of 45, with road safety initiatives and 
death rates varying widely across the EU 27.  Furthermore, figures indicate that many of the 
Central and Eastern European countries joining the EU on May 1, 2004, actually have had 
significant increases in their road fatalities since gaining their independence from the Soviet 
Union in the early 1990s.
(Figure 1 about here)
As indicated in Figure 1, road fatalities have decreased significantly since 1990, with 
accident fatalities in the EU decreasing from 56,414 in 1990 to 40,812 in 2000, a decrease of 
nearly 28% in a decade despite an enlargement in 1995 to fifteen countries. As Table 1 shows, 
the United Kingdom, Sweden, and the Netherlands had the fewest fatalities when standardizing 
the figures for traffic fatalities per million inhabitants.  Greece and Luxembourg are the only 
countries where the number of road fatalities did not show a downward trend during the decade 
of the 1990s, with Greece having a rate more that three times those found in the United 
Kingdom. Overall, the member states vary greatly in terms of current traffic fatality rates and the 
pattern of change in those rates over time.  
(Table 1 about here)
                                                
1 While road traffic in the EU has more than doubled between 1970 and 2000, the number of fatal casualties 
decreased by 48%.  Reasons for this decrease are discussed above. 5
Why is there so much variation across member-states?  Generally speaking, traffic safety 
is closely correlated with the number of cars in the country and the relative wealth of the country 
vis-à-vis other EU nations.  For instance, beginning in the 1970s, a general downward trend in 
the number of persons killed in road accidents is obvious in Figure 1.  However, this trend did 
not hold in Greece, Spain and Portugal, countries that made transitions to democracy during this 
era and that witnessed a rapid increase in the number of cars.  Without appropriate traffic 
infrastructures, and with more vehicles on the road to collide with one another, perhaps a rise in 
traffic fatalities in these three nations was unavoidable in the short-run.
2
There is also much variation in the amount of money, research, and development devoted 
to traffic safety across the EU.  Through the use of structural and cohesion funds, the EU has 
taken steps towards harmonizing traffic safety policy, encouraging higher safety standards in 
vehicles, better monitoring of the roadworthiness of the vehicle fleet, and improved road design.  
Still, the EU is constrained by budgetary and political considerations, given the pressures of 
enlargement upon the former, and the EU’s legislative remit in the latter.  For example, 
legislation pertaining to blood alcohol levels, speed limits, and safety belts remain within the 
policy realm of the member-states, and there is little indicating that the member-states are 
disposed to surrender this authority even if the political will existed at the EU level to 
standardize legislation. 
The European Road Safety Action Program
Despite being constrained fiscally and politically, the European Commission (EC) has 
taken steps to reduce the number of road fatalities across the EU.  As previously mentioned, 
                                                
2 Spain saw a significant decline in the number of traffic fatalities in the early 1990s, as did Portugal from the mid-
1990s onwards.  Unfortunately, Greece has shown little improvement.6
structural and cohesion funding have gone to improve road infrastructures, particularly in 
member-states in the south of Europe, and the EC has encouraged the standardization of traffic 
laws and regulations across the EU.  It was not until September 2001, however, that the EC made 
any formal statement on traffic safety.  In their White Paper entitled “European Transport Policy
for 2010: Time to Decide” the EC’s Directorate –General for Energy and Transport highlighted 
the many challenges facing the EU’s transportation network.  Forecasts completed by the DG 
predicted that economic growth and EU enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe would lead 
to greater mobility of people and goods, increasing traffic by 50% and annually adding more 
than three million new cars to already congested motorways.  This increase would have an 
impact upon air quality and the environment, increasing carbon dioxide emissions by 50% 
between 1990 and 2010.  
The White Paper contains an action plan of approximately 80 measures that address all 
modes of transportation.  These measures address three major objectives: 1) Shifting the balance 
between modes of transportation; 2) Eliminating bottlenecks; and 3) Placing users at the heart of 
transport policy.  The groundwork for these measures was laid in June 2001, when the 
Gothenburg European Council placed breaking the link between economic growth and transport 
growth at the heart of the EU’s sustainable development strategy.  However, despite institutional 
cooperation between the Council and the EC, it remains clear that many – if not most – of the 
member-states are less than willing to follow EU-wide initiatives, particularly when such
initiatives are not mandated through directives and are often viewed as stifling economic growth 
and mobility.
There is greater cooperation with the EC and the Council from the member-states, 
however, for those areas of the White Paper that address traffic safety.  Though the concern for 7
better traffic safety is varied across the member-states, each nation has grown to better appreciate 
the impact that traffic fatalities have on their national psyche and economy.  In addition to the 
40,000 traffic fatalities and 1.7 million injuries across the EU15, the EC estimated that the direct 
and indirect costs to member-states amounted to more than €160 billion in 2000, a full two 
percent of the EU’s GNP.  Pressure groups, parties, and elected officials have encouraged their 
governments to adopt the harmonization initiatives proposed by the EU to reduce traffic 
fatalities.  These initiatives include standardizing controls and signage, stiffening and 
harmonizing penalties for traffic infractions across the EU between now and 2005, the sharing of 
best practices, and creating an EU-wide training curriculum for drivers (Lamoureux, 6: 2002).
Signed on April 6, 2004, the European Charter on Road Safety is a key component of the 
EC’s European Road Safety Action Program designed to decrease the number of road deaths in 
Europe by at least 50% by 2010.  The charter was signed by 39 organizations representing 
industry, road user representative bodies, and other private and public organizations (EU press 
release, 1: 2004).  By signing, the 39 organizations pledge to pursue road safety goals set out by 
the EC and to a range of safety objectives and practical measures spelled out in the White Paper.  
As touched upon above, initiative areas include driving training, vehicle development, new 
roadway and other infrastructure design, the development and implementation of new 
technologies designed to reduce the consequences of accidents, and the development of uniform 
and continuous monitoring of driver and member-state compliance with traffic rules (EU press 
release, 2: 2004). 
Data and Methods
To test whether traffic safety policies reduce traffic fatalities in the EU15, we developed 
a cross-sectional time series model.  Due to constraints on reliable data from the EU and the 8
OECD, traffic fatalities in the EU15 are examined for the years 1995 to 2006.  The dependent 
variable – the number of traffic fatalities in member states during these years – is examined 
through eight independent variables.  These independent variables are: vehicle concentration in 
member states, unemployment rate by percentage, length of roadways, legal driving blood 
alcohol levels, speed on rural roadways, speed on highways, gross domestic product per capita, 
and alcohol consumption per capita are examined across time in the EU15. 
Governments can use a variety of policies to shape driving behavior and reduce fatalities, 
but we are primarily interested in the impact of road infrastructure, the allowed maximum speed 
limits on these roads, alcohol policy, and consumption of alcohol.  It is widely accepted that 
higher speeds can increase the severity of crashes (Bowie and Walz 1994; Garber and Graham 
1990; Moore, Dolinis and Woodward 1995), but the evidence on the impact of higher speed 
limits on U.S. traffic fatality rates is mixed.  Several studies have shown that the adoption of the 
55-mph speed limit in 1974 reduced the number of traffic fatalities (Meier and Morgan 1981; 
Kamerud 1988; Chirinko and Harper 1993), but the results have been less clear for speed limit 
increases in the 1990s.  Aggregate national analyses of the increase to a 65-mph limit have 
alternatively shown a significant increase in fatalities on interstates (Baum, Lund and Wells 
1989; Baum, Wells, and Lund 1990, 1991), a one-year temporary increase after implementation 
(Chang, Chen, and Carter 1993), and a decline in the overall state fatality rate due to a diversion 
of traffic (and corresponding fatalities) from other roads to rural interstates with higher speed 
limits (Lave and Elias 1994; Houston 1999).   
To test for the impact of speed limits, we gathered data on the highest maximum speed 
allowed on highways and rural motorways.  Generally, speed limits on highways are higher than 
on rural motorways, but more crashes occur in densely populated areas through which highways 9
run, so limits may have an impact.  Overall, despite the findings for the 65-mph limit in the U.S., 
we expect that the higher speeds allowed on EU highways to be associated with higher traffic 
fatality rates.  
The relationship between driving under the influence of alcohol and traffic safety has 
been well established, and one way to measure this effect is to use a variable for alcohol 
consumption.  Direct measures of alcohol gallons consumed per capita have been positively 
associated with fatality rates in American states (Chirinko and Harper 1993; Legge and Park 
1994; Houston, Richardson and Neeley 1996), and we use a proxy measure of this for the percent 
of household consumption devoted to alcohol products.  This measure could be seen as a control 
variable, but it also reflects a variety of policy programs designed to reduce consumption and 
drinking under the influence.  We intended to test the impact of various drinking and driving 
policies, but there was little variation for this small period of time and some problems with 
identifying older policy changes.  We hypothesize that higher rates of alcohol consumption will 
lead to higher traffic fatality rates. 
Closely related to alcohol consumption per capita are the legal limits placed on blood 
alcohol limits in EU member states.  In recent years, many member states have lowered their 
BAC levels significantly, with zero tolerance in several of the new member states.  At the same 
time, while the EU has encouraged a .5 g/l (grams per liter) BAC level in all member states, 
other member states such as Ireland, Malta, and the United Kingdom have maintained there level 
at .8 g/l BAC, while Cyprus is set at .9 g/l BAC.  Of course, we hypothesize that higher 
permitted BAC levels will lead to higher traffic fatality rates.  
Our main interest is in the impact of policies, but we also employed a number of control 
variables that have been significant in similar studies of US traffic safety.  It has been 10
hypothesized that states with more densely urbanized populations will have lower fatality rates 
for a number of reasons, such as availability of mass transit, lower speeds, roads with more 
safety features, better emergency response systems, and more health care availability.  Evidence 
from the US reveals a negative and significant relationship (Baker, Whitfield and O’Neill 1987; 
Houston et al 1996).  A second control variable is the length of paved roadway in kilometers by 
member state.   
The economy is also a potentially important factor shaping traffic safety, and we used 
gross domestic product per capita and unemployment as measures of the economy.  With higher 
levels of unemployment, it is hypothesized that fewer individuals will be on the roadways, and 
thus there will be fewer opportunities for fatal crashes to occur. As a result, we hypothesize that 
there will be an inverse relationship between unemployment rates as a percentage of the 
population and the number of fatal accidents.. 
Another factor affecting traffic safety is the average income of the country.  There are 
rival hypotheses for income with one arguing that it improves traffic safety but the other one 
arguing that it reduces traffic safety.  Some argue that higher income drivers will drive more 
recklessly knowing they have safer cars, good insurance, and busy lifestyles, but others argue 
that higher average income allows the purchase of more expensive cars with more safety 
features.  In addition, because we are measuring impacts at the aggregate level, countries with 
higher income may be able to devote more tax resources to road safety features, and higher 
income taxpayers may demand more safety features.  Studies of American states show that those 
states with higher average income experience lower fatality rates (Chirinko and Harper 1993; 
Legge and Park 1994; Houston et al 1996).  We use GDP per capita to measure average income, 
and we expect it to be negatively related with the traffic fatality rate.  11
Results
The results of the fixed effects estimation model of EU countries for 1995 to 2006 are 
presented in table 2. with raw results presented in table 3.  A cross-sectional time series
(Table 2 about here)
(Table 3 about here)
regression model chi square (not shown) is significant, and the R-square measures from the fixed 
effects model suggest reasonable fit.  Probably due to the short time frame of the data, the model 
is far better at explaining variation across member states (as shown by the high R-square 
between) than variation within a country over times (as seen in the small r-square within).  
Of the two speed variables, only the maximum speed limit on highways is significant.  
Higher speed limits on highways contribute to higher traffic fatality rates.  Clearly, public 
officials, advocacy, and interest groups seeking to reduce traffic fatality rates have and effective 
policy tool available.  Alternatively, although higher urban speeds are associated with higher 
fatality rates in other studies, the relationship in our analysis is neither in the direction expected 
no is it significant.  This finding does not suggest that urban speed limits should be eliminated or 
eased.  Rather, it is likely that the small variation in urban speeds across member states reduces 
the likelihood of finding significant results. 
Another area of potential concern for traffic safety in the EU is the impact of alcohol 
consumption on traffic fatality rates.  The alcohol consumption variable (measures as the percent 
of household spending) is significant at the .01 level, and the coefficient suggests that each one 
unit change in alcohol consumption has a large substantive effect on the traffic fatality rate.  This 
significant impact could suggest two things: 1) alcohol consumption in a state reflects cultural 12
and perhaps economic factors that may be the direct but unmeasured effects increasing the traffic 
fatality rate, or 2) EU member states have not adopted or implemented effective policies to 
mitigate the impact of alcohol on traffic fatality rates.  Considering that there was little variation 
across countries over the period from 1995 to 2006 for blood alcohol content laws and that they 
are generally much more stringent than in American states, the issue may be more of a problem 
with enforcement or with other policies curtailing drinking and driving, such as license 
revocation or mandatory jail time.  Clearly, further research on drinking and driving laws in the 
EU is needed.     
Two control variables were significant.  Vehicle congestion, as measured by vehicle 
density per capita, is significant in the expected direction, suggesting that more vehicles in a 
member state leads to more traffic fatalities.  However, this variable was significant at only the 
.10 level.  Of these two control variables, only GDP per capita was significant at the .05 level or 
below, which works as hypothesized.  States with higher incomes experience lower fatality rates.  
Surprisingly, the other control variables that work in the American context do not work in the 
EU
Findings for Research on Interest Groups
The analysis presented here encourages further investigation into the role that interest 
groups play in the formulation – or lack thereof – of traffic safety policies in the EU.  Originally 
designed to examine the impact that interest groups are having upon traffic safety policy in the 
EU27, it soon became apparent to us that the scope of the variables originally intended to be 
examined needed to be reduced.  In this process, inconsistencies and inadequate data for the 
twelve accession members of the EU made it difficult to isolate significant variables, and their 
relationship to traffic fatalities.  As a result, the scope of this research was significantly scaled 13
back to examine those independent variables in the EU15 that are impacting upon traffic 
fatalities.
While the key findings are presented below, the research presented here does lay the 
groundwork for future research on the role of interest groups in traffic safety policy in the EU.  
Interest groups that seek to influence speed limits and alcohol consumption will next be 
examined to answer two important questions.  First, what are the policy ramifications of interest 
group behavior working in the areas of speed limits and alcohol consumption; and second, how 
do regional variations in political culture and among political elites influence both interest group 
behavior and their impact upon the policy process?  The data collected here suggests that there 
are consistent regional variations in attitudes that may contribute to traffic fatalities in individual 
EU member states.  What remains to be seen is whether interest group activity has an influence 
upon these attitudes.  Thus, while the findings of this research are less than we had hoped, we are 
encouraged that these preliminary findings will help us better understand the relationship 
between traffic safety in the EU and the tactics of interest groups attempting to shape such 
policy.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to assess the factors shaping traffic safety in the EU and 
the role that interest groups have played in shaping traffic safety policies.  While the findings 
regarding the role of interest groups in traffic safety policy was not forthcoming in this 
preliminary research, it has suggested a number of variables that will be utilized in future 
research to measure the role of interest groups in advancing, or hindering, traffic safety policies 
in the EU.  Using a fixed affects estimation model of traffic fatalities in the EU for the years 14
1995 to 2006, we examined the impact of policies and several control variables that have been 
found to significantly influence traffic safety in American states.  We found some similarities, 
but the differences are interesting too.  
An important finding is that maximum speed limits on highways significantly 
affect traffic safety, and lowering these limits would reduce traffic fatalities.  In addition, 
wealthier member states have lower traffic fatality rates. Although higher speeds on highways 
are associated with higher fatality rates, maximum speed limits on urban roads were not found to 
have a significant impact.  Another variables that suggests the need for policies but does not test 
for policy effects is the alcohol consumption variable.  More alcohol consumption is significantly 
related to a higher traffic fatality rate.  Overall, if the EU hopes to achieve its goal of reducing 
fatalities by half by the year 2010, then reducing maximum highway speeds and passing and 
enforcing laws that reduce drinking and driving must be a part of such a strategy.   15
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Figure 1: Number of persons killed in road accidents in EU15
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Table 1: Number of persons killed in road accidents per million inhabitants
1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Belgium 196 143 134 134 147 137 143 144 131 117 112 104
Denmark 123 111 98 93 94 97 98 80 86 80 68 61
Germany 139 116 107 104 95 95 91 85 83 80 71 65
Greece 202 231 206 200 207 210 198 178 159 145 151 145
Spain 232 147 140 142 151 145 145 135 129 128 115 89
France 198 154 147 145 153 145 137 138 128 101 93 88
Ireland 136 121 115 128 123 109 109 107 96 84 94 83
Italy 126 123 116 117 110 115 111 117 117 105 98 90
Luxembourg 186 171 171 143 134 134 174 159 140 118 109 101
Netherlands 92 86 76 75 68 69 68 62 61 63 49 46
Austria 22 150 127 137 119 133 120 119 118 114 108 94
Portugal 305 273 275 253 243 192 181 161 165 148 124 118
Finland 130 86 79 85 78 83 77 83 80 73 72 72
Sweden 90 65 61 61 60 65 67 65 63 59 53 49
United Kingdom 94 64 64 63 60 60 60 63 63 62 57 55
EU15 155 125 118 115 114 111 109 105 104 104 101 100
Index 1990=100 100 80 76 75 74 72 70 69 68 68 66 65
Source: Eurostat and OECD data18
Table 2: Fixed effects estimation model explaining 
the number of traffic fatalities in EU15 member states
     
Coefficient Standard Error
Constant  1183.346      7741.948    
Vehicle Density per capita  1.557757* .9512824
Unemployment as % pop. -20.51601 14.16409
Length of roadway -.6474073 .0794002
BAC g/L -78.79224 485.8409
Speed rural highway -38.71084 91.06413
Speed highways 28.56131** 14.69098
GDP per capita -.0354223*** .0089833
Alcohol consumption 1183.346*** 7741.948
*** indicates less than .00 probability
**   indicates less than .05 probability
*     indicates less than .10 probability
R-sq:   Within = 0.6239
           Between = .8355
           Overall = .668919
Table 3: Cross-sectional time series regression model explaining 
the number of traffic fatalities in EU15 member states (Raw output)
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       224
Group variable: countrynum~r                    Number of groups   =        15
R-sq:  within  = 0.6239                         Obs per group: min =        14
       between = 0.8355                                        avg =      14.9
       overall = 0.6689                                        max =        15
                                                F(8,201)           =     41.68
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9476                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  fatalities |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
roadmotorv~a |   1.557757   .9512824     1.64   0.103    -.3180163     3.43353
unemployment |  -20.51601   14.16409    -1.45   0.149    -48.44529    7.413265
lengthofro~s |  -.6474073   .0794002    -8.15   0.000    -.8039716   -.4908431
   bacglitre |  -78.79224   485.8409    -0.16   0.871    -1036.791    879.2065
speedrural~h |  -38.71084   91.06413    -0.43   0.671    -218.2744    140.8527
speedhighw~h |   28.56131   14.69098     1.94   0.053    -.4069067    57.52952
   gdppercap |  -.0354223   .0089833    -3.94   0.000    -.0531359   -.0177087
  alcconsump |     358.12   55.95445     6.40   0.000      247.787     468.453
       _cons |   1183.346   7741.948     0.15   0.879    -14082.51     16449.2
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     sigma_u |  5053.5962
     sigma_e |  440.34549
         rho |  .99246469   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F test that all u_i=0:     F(14, 201) =    69.03             Prob > F = 0.0000